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Perestroyka, Social Justice and Soviet Public Opinion
David S. Mason and Svetlana Sydorenko

,I

n its formulation of plans to refmm the economy of Nhich this issue is resolved, Qr not resolved, willt1ave a
the USSR, the Soviet communist leadership has major bearing on the fate of perestroyka.
faced a major dilemma: how to reconcile eoonomic
efficiency with social justice. Perestroyka proposes to 11
••
•
accord an increased role to market mechanisms and
ustlce 10 CommtJolst Ideology
even private enterprise. However, a market economy
tends to create inequalities, and economiC inequalities fine concept of justice IS an elusive one both in Marx
collide with a strong sense of egalitarianism imbued in ! ist theory and in Soviet interpretations of that theory.
the population as part of communist ideology.
Marx's prolific writings are surprisingly devoid of refer
The issue of social justice, wielded by Mikhail Gorba ences to justice, and his followers have been reluctant
chev himself as a tool against sloth and underemploy to employ the concept. Under capitalism, they believe,
ment, has stimulated a lively debate among Soviet intel justice is an illusion, unattainable without structural
lectuals. At the same time, broader public sensitivity changes that would sweep away the entire system. In a
regarding the issue is becoming increasingly visible communist society, on the other hand, justice has no
with the widespread use of survey research and the meaning for Marxists, because the capitalist sourCes of
publication of its results. This creates a kind of spiral of injustice have disappeared. According to Robert ruck
discontent: the economy deteriorates and inequalities er, "the ideal of distributive justice is a complete strang
increase; journalists and academics openly discuss er in the moral universe of Marxism. "1 This may over
these problems; beCause of this publicity ("glas state the case. Others have argued that despite the
nost' "), the sense of injustice is heightened; and the re- lack of explicit references to justice, Marx and Marxists
gime's legitimacy is further eroded The whole phe "do have strong beliefs about justice. "2 Roy Medve"
nomenon suggests the emergence of the sense of dev, at one time a dissident Soviet historian and now a
relative deprivation and frustrated expectations that is member of the Supreme Soviet, wHo considers himself
characteristic of revolutionary situations The way in a Marxist, has said that "the idea of justice and a just so
ciety was the basic stimulus for the founders of Marxism
and their first followers."a
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Through the Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev years,
the concept of Justice was rarely discussed, When it
was, it was treated as a fait accompli. A 1987 booklet on
Socialist Society. Its Social Justice, for example, ar
gued that the "key factor in understanding the social
justice of socialist society" was the transfer of the own
ership of the means of production to the working peo
ple 7 To the extent that anyone questioned whether jus
tice had been achieved, the discussion was hidden
behind the issue of wages and wage distribution Even
the seemingly central communist concept of "social
equality" was rarely mentioned during this perlod B And
when the issue of equality was addressed, the focus
was on equality of opportunity rather than on equality of
result The persistence of social and economic inequal
Ities was explained by resorting to the Leninist formula
that differentiation was based on the quantity and quali
ty of labor. The adverse effects of such differences
were, however, to be mitigated by "social consumption
funds" in the form of free education and medical care,
student stipends, pensions, subsidized holidays, and
other allowances 9
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Chief engineer Tamara Soboleva prepares to test a
new fragrance a1 Moscow's New Dawn factory, which
produces perfume and eau de cologne

Reconsideration of Social Justice
The concept of social justice was reintroduced by the
two reformist leaders Yuriy Andropov and Mikhail Gor
bachev. Under Andropov, and in Gorbachev's first year
as party leader, the concept was used as an instrument
against official corruption and privileges. It also came
to have broader targets-lazy and inefficient workers
who received the same wages as good workers, and
those who receive "non-labor income." In all three
cases, people were seen as being rewarded by criteria
that were based neither on need (the communist formu
la) nor on work (the socialist one) To the extent that jus
tice was based on the socialist formula of reward for la
bor, people that received benefits other than ffom labor
were perpetrators of "inJustic\:l"
As Gorbachev and his advisers grappled with eco
nomic stagnation and living standards that had, ac
cording to one source, fallen to the point where they

-APfWlde World Photos.

dations of socialism lay in the ability to distribute
evenly. "4 He opposed excessively high wages for any
one and favored limits on income to prohibit unlimited
advantages in consumption or accumulation As a re
sult, there was a substantial reduction of income differ
entials.s However, by 1921, with the retreat from "war
i communism" and the beginning of the "New Economic
Policy," Lenin was enunciating a diluted concept of
, egalitarianism
{Wjhen we deal with distribution, to think that we
must distribute only fairly is wrong; we must think that
distribution is only the method, the means to raise
productivity. 6

Although Marx had written in the Critique of the Gotha
Program that the formula for the constitution of a com
munist society was "from each according to his abili
ties, to each according to his needs," he had also writ
ten (in that same work) that fn the first stage of
communism, i,e., socialism, people would be rewarded
according to their labor rather than their needs. Lenin
emphasized this latter formula This utilitarian ap
proach. rejecting utopian notions of Justice, dominated
official Soviet thinking thereafter

I

'Vladimir Lenin. Polnoye sobramye sochmeniy (Complete Collected
Works), Vol 36 Moscow. Po "ldat. 1967-70, p. 488
'V. G Rogovin, "Social Justice and the Socialist Dislrib"tior of Vilal
Goods,' Voprosy Filoso"i (Moscow) No 9, 1986, pp. 3-20, translated in
Soviel Sociology (Armork, NY;. Winler 1987, p. 48
"Op ell, Vol. 43, p 359
'M P, Mchedlov, Moscow Progress P"blishers. 1987, p 13,
6ldeolog'cal relererce books s"ch as Ihe 1984 Fundamental Concepts
01 CommuniS! MoraJlIy did nOI menllon il See Vladimir Shlaoentokh, Soviel
PubliC Opmion and Ideology. New York, Praeger, 1986, p. 55.
9Mchedlov op cit., P 23
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reached between 50th and 60th among the world's
countries,10 they increasingly focused on the need to
create greater financial and material incentives for effi
cient and productive labor-in the words of one sociol
ogist, to stimulate "the development of talents." 11 Such
an approach was bound to increase social inequality
and to thrust the issue of social Justice into the forefront.
Gorbachev tried to harness the concept as a tool
against egalitarianism and "leveling." At the 27th Con
gress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he
devoted a whole section of his report on behalf of the
Central Committee to social Justice. He observed:

necessary in the short term if there is to be greater
equality in the long term. 14
Despite the differences, commentators do seem to
share three common views. First. all writers stress that
the present stage of socialism is not able to deliver full
social and economic equality. Second, there is an effort
to put distance between the concepts of social justice
and social equality. And third, it is agreed that although
socialist societies will have to put up with inequality
in the short run, these inequalities can be mitigated by
social consumption funds. This is the extent of the
consensus.

[W]hen equal payments are fixed for the work of a
good employee and that of a negligent one, this is a
gross violation of our principles. And first of al/ it is an
intolerable distortion of socialism's basic principle:
"From each according to his ability, to each accord
ing to his work," which expresses the substance of
social justice under the new social system. 12

Wealth and privilege. One of the features of the re
forms was to encourage individuals to earn more mon
ey and to permit them to spend it for personal needs. In
1988, Gorbachev stated:

However, although Gorbachev's report to the con
gress asserted that "the unity of socialist society is by
no means a leveling of social life. " and stressed the ne
cessity of "overcoming egalitarianism in pay, etc.," it
also committed the party to overcoming unjustifiable
differences by expanding public consumption funds,
curtailing unearned incomes "and attempts to use pub
lic property for selfish ends," and eliminating "unjusti
fIed differences" in pay.13
The concept of social justice is thus two-edged. The
tension inherent in the concept reflects a broader ten
sion within the whole structure of reforms in the Soviet
Union: Gorbachev wants to achieve a more efficient,
market-based economy: but this will lead to inequality
in the form of wider income differentials and even un
employment, which tend to undermine the already frag
ile legitimacy of the communist regime.

We also must think about why a person in our country
who has earned money honestly is sometimes unable
to build the kind of house he wants, to buy a cooper
ative apartment, or to spend his wages in some other
way. The principle of socialism is violated in this
instance, too. A good toiler and his family should
feel that honestly earned money enables them to live
better. 15
This sort of encouragement for people to accumulate
wealth seemed to be in conflict with socialist prinCiples
It occasioned a lively debate in the Soviet press, in
which the dominant position seemed to say that wealth
is justified if it is earned "honestly" and by hard work.
One point in the debate revolved around a study from
Latvia shOWing that more than half of the total bank de
posits in the republic were concern rated in just 3 per
cent of the accounts. To the argument by sociologist V.
G Rogovin that such a disparity "should not exist in a

A-spects of the Debate

IOMosi<ovsi<iye Novosli {Moscow}. Aug 21. :~88. p 12. trans ,n Current
Digest 01 ttle SOVIet Press (Columbus, OH-hereafler CDSP). Oct 26. 1988.
p. 27. The article also observed Ihat the share 01 governmenl expendilures

Once the issue of social justice had been aired by
political leaders, academics began to develop the con
cept more fully, often in important philosophical and
party journals, including Voprosy FiJosofii (problems of
Philosophy) and Kommunist (the party Central Commit
tee's theoretical journal). There has been no consensus
among academics, however, either in defining social
Justice or in deciding how to achieve it. Some people
challenge the reforms because of their apparent retreat
from the egalitarian principles of socialism. Other
prominent theoreticians have argued that inequality is

gOing to human needs is higher in the United States than In the Soviet Union.
American eS!lmales show annual average growth in Soviet consumption
declining Irom 5 percent in the late 1960·s 10 jusl 08 percenl in the early
1980's See US Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Tne Soviet
Economy In 1988 Gorbactlev Cnanges Course. Washington. DC.
Governmenl Pnnting Office. 1989. p 41.
"A. G Zdravomyslov. ··The New Socio·Polit,cal Thl"king." Raboctl1Y
Klass I Sovremennyy Mir (Moscow), No.6. 1987. pp 3--15. trans in Soviet
Sociology. Vol 27, No.3. P 41.
'zPravda. Feb. 26. 1986.
IJlbid (emphasis added)
··See. for example. M. N Rutkevich. "Social Justice."
Sotslologlct1eSi<iye Issledovaniya (Moscow). No 3.1986. pp 13--25.
translated in Soviet SOCiology. Winler 1987. PrJ 5&--57
15ln a speech to the CPSU Central Commiltee. Pravda (Moscow).
Jan. 13. 1988. pp. 1-3, trans. in CDSP. Feb. 10. 1988. pp 1ft.
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tives of the market mechanisms that are central to the
economic reforms

Non-labor income. The concept "non-labor income"
raises numerous political and economic issues. The
struggle against such incomes-earned outside the of
ficial economy-has been a prominent issue for those
campaigning for social justice. Restricting these in
comes is seen as a way to temper the accumulation of
wealth that could occur with the greater differentiation
allowed in official incomes. One voice in this debate
has been that of Tat'yana Zaslavskaya, a reform-mind
ed sociologist who moved from Novosibirsk to Moscow
after Gorbachev assumed the party leadership.
Initially, Za~lavskaya and others equated "non-la
bor" income with "illegal" income. But even before
many of the reforms were implemented, it was evident
that the distinction between legal and illegal incomes,
'Customers at the window of a savings bank in Vilnius, or labor and non-labor incomes. was not always clear.
For example, the press raised questions regarding
Lithuania.
sales of goods in the farmers' markets, or the peddling
-APlWlde World Photoe.
of handiworks. 2o Gorbachev touched on the issue at
socialist society," Gennadiy Lisichkin, an economist, the 27th CPSU Congress, when he warned that "while
responded that it was all right, and suggested that it combating unearned incomes, we must not permit any
shadow to fall on those who do honest work to earn a
might well be due to honesty, hard work, and thrift Li
sichkin spoke of the need to "teach [people] how to supplementary income ,,21 The line between labor and
make money" and praised "those healthy people who non-labor incomes faded even further with the adoption
want not merely to receive more but to earn more ,,16 of new laws concerning cooperatives and "individual
labor activity. ,,22
Another sociologist has expressed the issue in lan
The issue of non-labor incomes becomes more com
guage reminiscent of Adam Smith: "Might we not hy
pothesize that rational calculation, material interests, plicated yet when social scientists such as Zaslav
and the striving for well-being are by no means alterna
skaya argue that anyone who benefits from subsidized
prices is, in effect, receiving unearned income. She
tives to virtue?"17
Soviet sociologists have pointed out that income dif
and others propose to eliminate such "income" by rais
ferentialton in the Soviet Union is not large. They cite ing rents for state-owned housing and reducing subsi
data showing that, on average, the most highly paid 10 . dies (i.e., raising prices) on meat, dairy products, and
percent of the population earns three times as much as other items in short supply.23 This proposal does, of
the most poorly paid 10 percent. Other data show the course, coincide with another central element of the
ratio between the minimum and maximum wages to be
about 10 to 1. 18 While some see such differences as .
1BLiteraturnaya Gazeta (Moscow). Feb 19. 1986. cited in Aaron Trehub.
contradicting the principle of social justice, others de
"Social Justice and Economic Progress," RadIO Free Europe-Radio Libeny
fend them as inevitable when profit and cost account
(hereafter, RFE-RL). Radio Liberty Research (Munich), RL 382/86, Ocl 7,
ing are introduced. As political scientist Fedor Bur
1986. pp 8-9.
latskiy put it: "You have to choose: either an active soci
"G S. Batyg,n, "Virtue Against Interesl." Sotsiologicheskiye
Issledovamya, No 3. 1!l87. pp. 24-36 trans. in Soviet Review (Armonk. NY).
ety with some kinds of differentiation, or a stagnant so
January-February. 1989. p 36
ciety with equality.,,19
1BRogovin. loe. cil.. p. 38
While arguing for greater differentiation, most advo
'"In a lecture at Stanford University. May 2. 1989 See also Rutkevich,
cates of reform do argue for placing restrictions at the ' loe cit. p. 59
lO'frehUb,loe cil., pp 7-8
"top," by reducing privileges and restricting non-labor . 2'Pravda. Feb. 26. 1986.
incomes,' and for cushioning the impact on the "bot
22The "Law on Individual Labor Activity" is reported In 'bid .. Nov 29,
tom," by increasing social benefits and minimum 1986: the "Law on Cooperatrves," in ibid. June 6. 1988
23Janet Chapman. "Income Distribution and SoCial JusUce in the Soviet
wages. Both undertakings are difficult and complex, Union," Comparative Economic Studies (Lake Forest, IL). Spring 1989.
and they often run counter to the dynamics and impera
pp 35-39
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economic reform-price rationalization. But benefiting
. from subsidies on the price of meat is a far cry from
, profiting from black market operations.

their distribution, Some argue that they heavily favor the
elite. and in fact do not guarantee much to the ordinary
citizen. Sociologist Yuriy Levada, for example, states
that,

Concern for those less well off. The debate over so
cial justice in the popular and academic literature has in comparison with other developed countries and,
more important, as a measure of the growth of our
also touched on issues of unemployment and of pover
ty among working-age and retired citizens. Burlatskiy, , own social needs. we do have not too much, but
for example, has expressed concern over managers rather too little real social and economic guarantees.
who ta~ of reducing their workforces by a quarter or There are no guarantees of a minimum hourly wage,
a minimum standard of living, necessary medical ser
more, when "guaranteed labor and social security con
stitute the chief gains of the socialist system, ,,24 With vices, kindergarten facilities, and so on. 29
the official poverty level at 75 rubles a month (some So
viet economists say a more realistic figure would be Levada also sees the constitutional guarantee of em
near 100 rubles a month), the press has shown concern ployment as empty verbiage in the absence of a system
for the country's 58 million older citizens (more than a of institutional guarantees such as job retraining pro
third of whom live on pensions of less than 58 rubles a grams, dissemination of information about job vacan
month) and for some 40 million people earning less cies, and credits or subsidies for the unemployed,
than 75 rubles a month,25 The issue of poverty also sur
Others argue that society pays too high a price for the
faced in the miners' strikes in Siberia and Ukraine in the guarantees offered, and that welfare payments should
summer of 1989, and was one of the factors that led the go only to the truly needy. For example, Ludmilla Piya
sheva, an economist who openly calls for shilling the
government to increase pensions in 1990. 26
Soviet economy toward capitalism. argues that the
Such issues Will become increasingly viSible and ac
rimonious as the economic reforms lead to price in
present system "makes every citizen a petitioner for his
creases, a reduction in state subsidies. and layoffs of share of social benefits that are not given automatical
workers. As a 1988 Novosibirsk seminar on pere
ly" and forces citizens to depend, therefore, on the be
stroyka concluded, "the practice of carrying out trans
nevolence of officials, The social consumption funds,
formations here in our country and in other socialist she argues, lead to an excessive concentration and
countries has shown that reform cannot be both deep centralization of power, demand enormous expendi
and 'genl/e' at the same time."27 Already, Soviet citi
tures by the state, and give to the state functions "that
zens are feeling the bite of such changes, Unemploy
can and should be accomplished by the citizens them
ment is now estimated at 6 percent of the able-bodied selves." In this sphere, she continues, "the state must
population-some 8 million people-and is expected radically limit its power and participation, for its ser
to double within the next five years. 28 Among other vices are too expensive, of low quality and, as long ex
things, the Novosibirsk report recommended "an entire perience has shown, contradict the principles of social
system of socio-economic compensations, equalizers. justice. ,,30
and shock absorbers" to cope with such problems.
The impoverished state of large segments of the So
Class conflict and social justice. Philosopher Brian
viet population has raised new concerns over the sys
Barry has written that "the problem of distributive jus
tem of social consumption funds. which purported Iy ex
tice arises only when there is a conflict of interest; it is
ist to satisfy basic needs and equalize living standards. moot when there is a harmony of intereSI."31 With the
Increasingly, however, there are criticisms both of the Soviet economic reforms, we are likely to see increas
effectiveness of these resources and the fairness of ing tension and conflict as some become wealthy un
der the new system, and others remain poor. In effect.
class conflict looms on the Soviet scene, This will be
most pronounced in the Russian republic, although in
24"Learn Democracy,"f'ravda. July 18,1987, p. 3,trans. in CDSP,
Aug. 19. 1987, P 8.
25Esther Fein, "In Lenin's Classless Society." The New York Times,
May 7, 1989: and Izvesriya (Moscow), Aug. 8. 1990, pp 1-2
"Yuriy Levada, "Which Resources Are Exhausted?" in F. M BorQdkln el
26A new "Law on Pensions" increases mosl pensions and indexes them
al.. Eds, Post,zheniye (Understanding), Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1989,
to prices. See Izves/iya, May 15,1990, lranslaled in CDSP, June 20,
p. 81
1990,p 18
JOL I. P,yasheva, "Outlines 01 aRadical Economic Reform," in ibid,
27Nedelya (Moscow). May 2-8, 1988, trans. In CDSP, June 22, 1988,
pp 270'275
28/zvesllya, Apr. 7, 1990, P 1, trans In CDSP, May 9, 1990, p, 5
J'Ciled in Roberl E. Lane. "Markel Jusllce. Political Justice," American
pp 18--19
Po/trical Science Review (Washington, DC). June 1986, p 393
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in some cases become a "conflict between social inter
ests."35 Radical change of the economy will only exac
erbate such conflicts, as Zaslavskaya acknowledged
. in a 1987 interview.36 In short, the reforms are sacrific
ing harmony for efficiency.

Public Opinion and Social 1ustice

Social worker Katya Pavlova brings food to pensioner
Lyudmilla Kuzmina and notes what she has to buy
next.
-I. ZolInlTASS from SovIOCo.

other republics. where ethnic issues predominate,
class divisions may actually reinforce the ethnic ones.
Already in the late 1960's and early 1970's, some So
viet writers were modifying their treatment of classes
and social stratification and admitting that inequality of
social groups afflicted socialist as well as capitalist so
cieties. 32 They were also recognizing that such contra
dictions in a socialist society could be antagonistic
rather than harmonious.33 In the 1980's. sociologist
Tat'yana Zaslavskaya led the way in exploring more
deeply the bases for conflict among different social
groups. She wrote in 1985 that "[t]he driving force of
behavior is personal and group interest," and that al
though Soviet society may be one of "moral and politi
cal unity, , . , every social group has its own special in
terests, which may come into contradiction with the
interests of other groups. ,,34 A colleague of hers, V, G.
Rogovin. has even said that these "contradictions" may
l2See Murray Yanowilch, SOCIal and Economic Inequality In Ihe Soviel
Union' Six Sludies. While Plains, NY, M. E Sharpe. 1977, p. 6.
llSee Ernst KUl<, "Conlradicrions in Soviet SOCialism," Problems 01
;ommunism (Washington, DC), November-December 1984, pp 1-27
l4T I Zaslavskaya, "The Social Mechanism of the Economy," lnaniye
,ila (Moscow), No 10, 1985, pp 3-5. trans If1 Soviet Sociology, Fall 1987.
pp 35-36
A group 01 economists and sociologists led by Zas1avskaya concluded
lhatthe well known Marxist-Leninist cr;terion lor identifying class and social
groups-fhell, relationship 10 the means of production-needed to be
relined with the use of such factors as "the extent of their executive authority
and prerogatives, the economic sector in which a group operales, the
volume and structure 01 the means 01 production thaI a group puIS into
circulation. and the opportunity to use them for personal ends or to own
them .. See Nedelya, May 2-8, 1988. p. 11, trans in CDSP, June 22. 1988

So far we have discussed only the views and posi
tions of Soviet officials and scholars. But, of course,
one needs also to explore the altitude regarding social
justice of the general Soviet public, which has become
increasingly vocal and feisty. The Gorbachev leader
ship has invited the public to speak out. and has en
couraged new public opinion research to allow the re
gime to gauge popular attitudes. In some cases, how
ever, especially on the issue of social justice, the public
mood runs counter to the interests of the reformers.
The role of public opinion research, like so much else
in the Soviet Union, is undergoing dramatic change in
the Gorbachev era. During most of the years of the So
viet regime, public opinion polling was seen as "a use
ful and aUXiliary instrument of social management, "37
and the leadership consistently resisted research that
might reveal hostility to the system, During the "thaw" of
the Khrushchev era, public opinion studies were per
mitted to explore a wider range of topics But even then,
according to Boris Grushin, a prominent public opinion
researcher, social scientists were like "a scientific
council for Genghis Khan" -public opinion research
did not much influence the authorities, and in-depth,
probing research was a dangerous enterprise.3 8 After
Nikita Khrushchev's removal in autumn 1964, scientific
public opinion research generally withered away,
Things have changed radically in recent years. Emi
gre Soviet sociologist Vladimir Shlapentokh has argued
that "popular attitudes in the USSR can have an impor
tant impact in a period of crisis. when there is no unity at
the apex of power, or when the leadership desperately
needs the cooperation of the population, ,,39 All three
conditions now pertain, and consequently, public opin
•ion research has been given a stronger role than ever
l'Rogov;n, loc. cit, p 30
)&'If we want. . radical changes
there will be a relative change in
the sltuallon 01 classes, groups, and slrata of sociely," Zaslavskaya observed,
with "advantage for some,. . disadvantage lor others." Cited In Walter
Connor, Socialism's Dilemmas. Slale and Society in the Soviet Sloc. New York,
Columbia University Press, 1988, p 127
l7Vladimir Shlapentokh, Soviet Public Opinion and Ideology, New York,
Praeger, 1986, p. 115
l8Boris Grushin. "Scientific Council for Ghengis Khan," Novoye Vremya
:Moscow), No. 43, October 1988, pp 30--32
19Shlapen10kh,OP cit., p 131
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before in Soviet history. A number of public opinion re
search centers have appeared, including the All-Union
Center for the Study of Public Opinion, headed by the
liberal and iconoclastic Tat'yana Zaslavskaya. 4o
Zaslavskaya has argued both for more honest and
sophisticated sociological research and for greater at
tention by the authorities to the needs and voices of the
public. She sees public opinion research as a tool that
is both informational and political: one that is necessary
for the development and implementation of new poli
cies. Management organs, she wrote in Pravda,
greatly need full, accurate, and truthful information
about the real state of affairs in any sphere of social
life and the requirements, interests, values, and be
havior of social groups . ... the light of sociological
research must penetrate the remotest corners of pub
lic life, expose the accumulated dust. and stimulate
the speediest possible cleaning up of our common
house 41
What the public opinion surveys reveal, however, is
not always pleasing to the reformers. Although Gorba
chev and his advisers appear to have won out in the
policy and academic debate with "conservatives" on
the need to temper commitment to social justice in the
interest of economic reform and efficiency, the leader
ship finds opposition on such matters from the general
public.
In particular, "the strong strand of economic egalitar
ianism" detected by Western scholars of Soviet politi
cal culture 42 has proven to have great staying power
The Gorbachev leadership may have considered that
such egalitarianism was part of the old system of incul
'OUp 10 now, Zaslavskaya's group is the only organrzation conducting
nationwide surveys in the USSR. The Center has conducted about two surveys
per monlh through some 23 regional cenlers in all of the 15 republics
Because of growing ethnic tension in the Soviet republics over the last yep"
some ot these regional centers are no longer operating, and Ihe scope 01
the "national" surveys has been reduced; they no longer include all 01 the
republics.
This raises the question of whether the Center's surveys genuinely
represent the whole country, and in particular whether they obscure important
dillerences among republics and nationalities. Researchers at Ihe Center
have responded that on mosl of the Center's survey questions discussed in
thiS Micle. there were nOI significant dilferences among republics.
Nevertheless, these issues have not been systematically explored
"Pravda. Feb 6. 1987, trans as "Perestroika and Sociology," Social
Research (New York), Spring/Summer 1988, pp. 268 and 276
2
4 Archie Brown, "Ideology and Political Culture," in Seweryn Bialer, Ed .
Politics, SocIety and Nationally Inside Gorbachev's Russia. Boulder. CO.
Westview. 1989. pp 31-32
As the USSR divides and disintegrates, a "Soviet political culture"
ceases 10 exist But elements of that culture, particularly economic
egalitarianism, remain in much of the country, and especially among
Russians See, for example. Hedrick Smith's discussion of "The Russian
Character," The New York Times MagaZine, Oct 28, 1990.

cated values and would be dissipated in the new atmo
sphere of openness and democratization. Public opin
ion surveys reveal that this has not happened.
A 1988 survey of Moscow residents, in asking how in
comes should be distributed, found fully 38 percent of
those questioned agreeing with the proposition that
"Society should strictly control incomes so that all its
members live in approximately equal material condi
tions"-a radically egalitarian point of view. A larger
share of the sample (48 percent), felt that incomes
should be distributed based on the quantity and quality
of labor, but should not be "excessive." In identifying
various "types of political consciousness," the same
survey found the proportion of the sample favoring a
system that promoted social justice to be much higher
(41) percent than that of those who favored a more
pragmatic orientation (14 percent).43 Reformers intent
on introducing Western-style pragmatism to the Soviet
economy could find little comfort in these results.
More surprising, a 1989 survey of the Soviet urban
population found only 2.5 percent who viewed the cur
rent distribution of incomes in Soviet society to be
"just." Almost two-thirds of the sample believed that dif
ferences in income had increased in the past two to
three years. And when asked "do you expect that pere
')troyka will make the distribution of incomes in society
more just?" only 31 percent answered "yes"; 25 per
cent thought "no"; and 44 percent were not sure 44
The "conservative" cast of public opinion is also evi
dent in attitudes regarding diverse forms of enterprise
Jwnership. A national survey found that a majority of re
spondents (71-72 percent) supported collective own
ership and joint ventures, but only 31 percent favored
private ownership. 45 Even the new cooperatives (which
are not based on private property) are widely distrust
ed. The 1989 urban sample mentioned above found
only 25 percent approving of cooperatives, and 50 per
cent disapproving. 46
43Leontiy Byzov and Nikolay L'vov. "Perestroyka. Po":ical
Consciousness and Social Relations," Vek XX i Mir (Moscow). March 1989.
p 15-16, and 12 Byzov is the director of the scientific research center 01
the Soviet Sociological Association. another new organization, atfiliated with
Ie Academy of Sciences. The poll was conducled in November
ecember 1988 among 1,231 residents of Moscow.-half by a random
!Iephone sample and half by in-person Interviews
"All-Union Center tor Public Opinion Research. "Altitudes ollhe
opulation Toward Radical Economic Reform." Obshchestvennoye Mneniye v
iilrakh (PubliC Opinion in Figures). October 1989. Moscow. based on a
~mple of 1.148 residents of 19 Cities in the RSFSR and six other repUblics.
45Komsomolskaya Pravda (Moscow). Dec 12. 1989 This antipathy to
rivate ownership was expressed. it might be noted, primarily in connection
,th ownership of heavy industry
'"See fn. 44 The pUblic IS agitated about the high prices that
)operatives charge and the high incomes e%yed by their proprietors See
nthony Jones and William Moskoll. "New Cooperatives in the USSR,"
'oblems 01 Communism, November-December 1989. pp 32-35.
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Gorbachev and other leaders are fully aware of these
popular perceptions. and frequently voice frustration
at "leveling" attitudes and the persistence of a "non
market psychology" in the population. Speaking to the
Central Committee in early 1988, Gorbachev com
plained that "our understanding of social Justice has
been deformed" If the leadership were to implement
certain notions advocated in the press, he said. "we
would have to take up a big iron and iron out all of our
society. Everyone would have to fit the same pattern:
the gifted person and the untalented, the conscientious
worker and the loafer. the honest man and the thief." He
mentioned cases of productive workers who increased
output by several hundred percent, but whose wages
had grown by "only 50-1 00 percent" But even such in
creases, too small from his point of view. cause people
to complain and worry that they might lead to a "private
ownership mentality. ,,47
Although displeased by these popular attitudes,
Gorbachev recognizes their power. At a Central Com
mittee meeting in late 1989. one participant repeated
the argument of economist Vasiliy Selyunin that "in a
month, the market would put everything in order." Gor .
bachev interrupted:

state "should not allow excessive differences between
ow and high incomes." Sixty percent supported the
rationing of scarce commodities, and only 5 percent
favored flexible pricing 49
If Soviet citizens feel some ambivalence about the
economic reforms and the tension between egalitarian
ism and efficiency. they are categorically opposed to
another element of inequality: elite privileges. Although
30rbachev and hiS advisers have addressed the issue,
many feel that they have not moved forcefully enough.
This issue may account in part for the popularity of Boris
Yel'tsin, recently elected President of the Russian Re
public. Yel'tsin's populism plays on the popular sense
of egalitarianism. which is manifested both in concern
forthe poor and resentment against the rich. At the 27th
Party Congress in 1986, Yel'tsin voiced complaints
about privileges and "special goods for leaders" and
asserted that "the criterion of social justice must always
be the interests of the working class above all. ,,50 He re
vived these themes at the Congress of People's Depu
ties in May 1989. wondering aloud "why are tens of mil
lions living below the poverty line while others are
wallowing in luxury?"51
These powerful themes find a sympathetic hearing
among many citizens. After the May session of the leg
I know but one thing. In two weeks this "market" islature, the All-Union Center for Public Opinion Rewould draw all the people into the streets and sweep , search conducted a poll containing questions about
away any government, however much it might vow fi Yel'tsin's proposal to transform the Fourth Division of
the Ministry of Health (a special division for high party
delity to its people. 48
3nd state officials) into medical facilities for maternal
A closer look at the egalitarianism of at least some and child care. Almost everyone agreed with this (75
members of the Soviet public, however, reveals that the percent, in full; and 16 percent, mainly); only 2 percent
prospects for reform are not totally hopeless. There is disagreed S2
some evidence that public concern with social justice
The popular sense of egalitarianism is linked to an
issues is instrumental in nature. i.e .. social justice is . underlying support for socialism, and considerable dis
trust of both capitalism and the entrepreneurial spirit.
seen as a means of achieving a higher personal stan
This basic support for socialism has been noted by so
dard of living. For example, a survey conducted in Len
ingrad city to determine how the populace evaluated ciologists and other observers both in the Soviet Union
various periods of Soviet history revealed that "the de
and in the West. It is due in part to the semi-successful
gree of improvement of the material situation" was giv
propaganda that has led many Soviet citizens to sup
en much greater weight than "the degree of justice in port "the key official vaJues and beliefs."53 But it is also
the diHerences in the material well-being of various
strata" (see Table 1).
"Pravda. Jan 13. 1988. trans In CDSP, Feb. 10. 1988. P 3
48Pravda. Nov 6. 1989.
The public is also ambivalent, even schizophrenic,
4"Ail·Union Center for Public Opinion Research, "Attitude of the
about the role of the state in insuring social justice. In an
'opulal;on Toward Radical Economic Reform," loc. cil.
urban survey on economic reform conducted in au
SOCited in Rogovin. loc cit. pp 34-35
tumn 1989, 63 percent of the respondents agreed that. $'QuOled in Aaron Trehub. "The Congress of People's Deputies on
overly." Radio Liberty. Report on the USSR (Munich). June 16. 1989. P 6
the state should interfere "as little as possible" in the
$20gone k (Moscow). No. 34. August 1989, pp 2-3 The survey reported
distribution of incomes. At the same time. 85 percent
I Ogonekwas based on a sampleo! 2.100 people ranoomlyse1ecled from 47
thought that the state should "give more privileges to
lies ,n mosl of the republics.
$3See. for example, Connor. op cil. esp pp 71-75 and 134--135: Gail
people with low incomes," and 84 percent agreed that
aplOus. "Stale and Society Toward the Emergence 01 Civil Society In the
the state should guarantee to each person a minimum
ov,et Union." ,n Sialer, op Cit. pp 143--34: Shlapentokh, op cit, esp
income. Almost half (48.9 percent) also felt that the
p 4. 124: and Medvedev. loc cit. esp pp 11-12 and 16--17
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Table 1: Criteria Used by Soviet Citizens to Evaluate Historical Periods
Percentage 01 respondents cittng criterion. by educational !evel
r--~~-----------------------'--

Criterion

Higher education

Secondary education

less than secondary

73

56
36
38

38
23
31

28
20
25
19
25

23
21
21
33
32

, The degree of Improvement in the material situation
The development of the economy of the country
Degree of support for the personal incentive of the worker
Degree of justice In the differences in the material well-being
of various slrata
The character of sacrifices required lor development
Rate of economic growth
Degree of order, labor discipline in Ihe country
Hard 10 say

60

52
27
26
25
16

5

SOURCE: A March-June 1989 survey 01 Leningrad citizens by the Institute of Scciolcgy. See B Z. Doktorov, "Malerials lor A Summary Account on the Theme
Social and Economic Probiems of Development of Large Cities," presented at a Soviet-American Colloquium on Public Opinion, Moscow, December 1989 The
survey was based on a mail canvass o! 900 randomly selectea Leningraa resiaents. They were asked tc evaluate a range of historical perioas from the New Eco
ncmlc Policy cf the mld-1920's on through collectivization to perestroyka

a result of the real success of the Soviet state in raising
the standard of living and assuring most citizens a ba
sic level of security, at least up to the 1970's. As Roy
Medvedev has put it, "our country has achieved no
mean progress in the area of individual economic, cul
tural, and social rights that to all intents and purposes
did not exist in tsarist Russia. ,,54 From the point of
view of many Soviet citizens, capitalism may produce
wealth, but It also requires hard work, brings uncertain
ty and insecurity, and fosters inequality, Such percep
tions pose a real obstacle to efforts of the reformers to
move the economy toward competition, market pricing,
and greater economic and social differentiation.
Ironically, the tendency of the public to look to the
state to ensure social justice carries within it the seeds
of a solution to some of the reformers' dilemmas. In the
past, Soviet citizens largely accepted the centralized
role of the state and conceded politics to the authori
ties. The official ideology postulated equality and social
welfare, and the citizens supported that. Now, howev
er. Gorbachev is reshaping the ideology, demanding
hard work, legitimizing competition and differentiation,
and giving credence to the market. If Soviet citizens (or,
at least, Russian ones) continue past patterns of ac
cepting the vision of the world proffered by their lead
ers, then eventually they might come around to Gorba
chev's point of view, and be more accepting of these
new concepts and ways of life. If they do not, the
reforms will fail.
These social and political obstacles to reform are, of
course, increasingly compounded and complicated by
the growing nationalities disputes and the step-by-step
fragmentatton of the Union. The task of bringing the
population over to the market will be no less difficult ir
an environment of national conflict, political instability.
and the decay of central authority,

But even without the nationalities problem, Gorba
..;hev's task is a big one He must, essentially, reshape
the political culture of the population As Samuel
3arnes points out in a comparative study of politics and
culture, "culture suggests the 'easy' behavior ... cul
tural patterns provide the routine, largely unexamined
options followed by most people most of the time."55
For most Soviet citizens, it was "easy" to accept the So
viet welfare state, its centralized political structure, and
the system's undemanding work ethic In trying to alter
these patterns. the Gorbachev leadership will have to
disrupt the easy behavior of citizen compliance with
them. The end result may be attractive, with more citi
zen participation and a higher standard of living, but
.he transition period will be a difficult and wrenching
one for both the society and the leadership.
For now, Gorbachev's economic and political reforms
jo not attract a broad constituency. The only clear
'winners," to borrow from Peter Hauslohner's analysis,
are the professionals,56 In the working class, there may

""Medvedev, ioc. c,t., pp 11-12 Allhcugh popular trust in the party has
>een declimng steadily over the lasl Iwo years. in Augusl 1990, some 38
percent of a group surveyed expressed fu!1 or partial ccnfidence in the
organization (compared 10 42 percent who did not). Data based on nallonal
samples. ana trom the archives 01 the Ail-Union Center for Public Opinion
Research For a report of even higher 'evels of trust 'n the pal1y, see Lev
Gudkcv and Yuriy Levada. "Who Is Ahead?" Ogonek. No. 25, June 1990,
p'1 Given the events 01 the last year, it is diffiCUlt to knew whether to be
surprised more by Ihe decline or by the persistence ot any support at all.
SS"Polltics ana Cullure." a paper presented at the Hoovel Institution,
Stanford University, March 1989. p. 28.
ssPele. r Hauslohner. "Gorbachev's Social Contract," Soviet Economy
(Washington. DC). January-March 1987. p 83. ThaI support lor reform omy
comes from those engaged tn creative work. hIghly 'skilled specialists. ana
high-level managers was confirmed by the 1988 Novosibirsk seminar on
-eslructunng. See Aleksey Ulyukayev. "Restructunng Who's For It and
Who's Against It?" Nedelya. May 2~, 1988. trans. in CDSP. June 22. 1988.
pp 18--19.
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also be a new stratum of winners in those who capitalize vould need to nudge the Soviet population, or a good
on the new economic incentives and entrepreneurial )art of it, toward such a preference for market justice.
In the process, the Soviet state will reduce its com
possibilities, but probably not many workers see themselves fitting into that category just yet. These constitu- mitment to satisfying the norms of social justice, by cut
encies are much too small to sustain the reforms over a
'ng back on its distributive role. This will put it in a
long period, especially given the regime's encourage- dangerous position. The population as a whole has be
ment of democratization and grass-roots political activ- "'ome increasingly dissatisfied with the political system,
ity. Unless the state or the economy can generate some '3nd with the heretofore meager results of economic pe
positive material benefits for the workers, the Kremlin is . restroyka. Groups that profited from the old arrange
likely to confront many more of the kinds of strikes ments-unskilled workers, bureaucrats. and collec
staged by miners in Siberia and Ukraine. Gorbachev tive-farm workers-are especially unhappy with the
has recognized this problem, telling the Central Com- government. Meanwhile, the regime is also under fire
mittee in January 1988 that "just two or three years will from groups-skilled workers, the creative intelligen
tsia, some high-level managers, and industrious fardecide where restructuring is going."S?
mers-that want more radical reforms in respect to
property and politics. Hence. it is in danger of losing all
Political Justice or Market Justice?
of its constituencies, and therefore its legitimacy.
Under Gorbachev's reforms, "justice" is increasingly
Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership face multiple to be achieved through hard work and commitment to
dilemmas in the next two or three years. With democra quality. The burden will be more on the individual. This,
tization, perestroyka, and glasnost', they have un of course, begins to sound like the free enterprise sys
leashed social forces that will not be easy to control. tem that both Gorbachev and most Soviet citizens pro
Perhaps the most important problem is in managing, or fess not to want. The Gorbachev leadership remains
satisfying, popular expectations. Since 1985, Gorba committed to socialism, and the population remains
chev has been pledging "radical reform" and even somewhat egalitarian and supportive of the welfare
"revolutionary" changes in the Soviet Union. The re state. This constitutes, then, the central dilemma facing
forms he promotes are meant to move the Soviet Union the Soviet Union: how to create a more efficient society
to a higher plane of development. For most Soviet citi without sacrificing too much of the commitment to so
zens, however, little has changed; indeed, in many cial justice. The ideology of communism, the achieve
.
:ases, the situation has worsened.
ments of the Soviet state, and the legitimacy of the re
The basic problem for the Gorbachev leadership, gime have been based in large measure on the
then, becomes one of shifting popular expectations of commitment to justice. The future of the regime, howev
justice from the political system to the marketplace, and er, depends on making the country more efficient, in
then in getting the market to work. In a discussion of . terms of satisfying the matertal needs of its population
perceptions of justice in the United States, Robert Lane and being competitive in the world market.
. 1S argued that Americans prefer "market justice" to
"political justice"; "they prefer the market's criteria of
51M Gorbachev. "Democratization Is .he Essence 01 Restructuring ana
earned deserts to the polity's criteria of equality and
the Essence 01 Socialism," Pravda. Jan. 13. 1988, trans. in CDSP. Feb. 10,
need, and believe that market procedures are more fair 1988.p.4
than political procedures. ,,58 If Gorbachev is going to
58Lane, Ioc. cit, p. 387.
succeed in the Soviet Union, it would seem that he .
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